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Learning algorithms, technologies that generate responses, classifications, or dynamic predictions that 
resemble those of a knowledge worker, raise important research questions for organizational scholars 
related to work and organizing. We suggest that such algorithms are distinguished by four consequential 
aspects: black-boxed performance, comprehensive digitization, anticipatory quantification, and hidden 
politics. These aspects are likely to alter work and organizing in qualitatively different ways beyond simply 
signaling an acceleration of long-term technology trends. Our analysis indicates that learning algorithms 
will transform expertise in organizations, reshape work and occupational boundaries, and offer novel forms 
of coordination and control. Thus, learning algorithms can be considered performative due to the extent to 
which their use can shape and alter work and organizational realities. Their rapid deployment requires 
scholarly attention to societal issues such as the extent to which the algorithm is authorized to make 




Recent technological developments have given rise to algorithms that are capable of learning from 
data to undertake tasks that previously required human judgement. Such a development could be the most 
consequential to work and organizing since the beginning of the digital age sixty years ago. Algorithms 
have historically been understood as a program containing a fixed sequence of instructions executed until 
a solution is reached (Hopcroft and Ullman, 1983). Algorithms function by taking in data that has been 
restructured, formatted, and prepared for processing. With continuous advances in programming science, 
coupled with Moore’s law (the continuous increase in hardware computing power), algorithms are 
becoming more predominant and performant, reaching a crucial stage of evolution.  With the digitization 
of most economic and social interactions, algorithmic technologies are now being used on a hitherto 
unforeseen and unknown scale. Driving the change is the emergent set of learning technologies that were 
developed in the field of artificial intelligence.  For the first time since the rise of the field of artificial 
intelligence half a century ago, learning algorithms are able to perform reliably, and potentially exceed, an 
increasing array of tasks that historically had been the domain of humans. We use the term learning 
algorithms to refer to an emergent family of technologies that build on machine learning, computation, and 
statistical techniques, as well as  rely on large data sets to generate responses, classifications, or dynamic 
predictions that resemble those of a knowledge worker.  
 Beyond the recognition that a growing part of humanity now collaborates and communicates 
digitally, it is important to recognize that such technologies are increasingly impacting broader aspects of 
society.  For example, algorithms change newsroom culture by providing a measure of the readership of 
online newspaper articles, to emphasize stories likely to be popular (Christin, 2014).  They alter legal 
procedure and judicial discretion by introducing statistical models of crime prediction in legal proceedings 
and identifying perpetrators (Christin, 2016). Algorithms that manage engine functioning have been used 
by car manufacturers to defeat engine pollution tests (Ramsey, 2015) or by Uber to avoid city inspections 
(Krisher, 2017). Algorithms are also constitutive for the modern electoral campaigns, as they help sway 
votes by targeting individual citizens with customized cross-platform communications that emphasize 
select memes, images, keywords, hashtags, analyses and stories, based on an analysis of the content of a 
person’s corpus of online communication (Cadwalladr, 2017; Shaffer, Carey, and Starling, 2017).  
For many scholars, algorithmic technologies do not seem to qualitatively differ from previous 
developments of the digital age (e.g., the personal computer, the Internet, Web 2.0) that have each heralded 
novel ways of organizing or new business models. They enable digital platforms and the shift to the short-
term employment. Algorithm developments positively increase economic output by broadly increasing 
consumption (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). For firms, they increased economic gain via improved 
targeting capacities, reduced costs, and enhanced productivity (Newell and Marabelli, 2015). Beyond 
economic value, however, predictions of future consequences are mixed. Some analyses emphasize that 
learning algorithms are likely to take over major aspects of the knowledge economy, threatening to 
extinguish up to half of full-time jobs in the United States within two decades (Frey and Osborne, 2017).  
Despite the increasing prevalence of learning algorithms in every facet of work and life, and the multitude 
of associated predictions surrounding the future of work, scholars and practitioners alike are only now 
beginning to understand their transformative effects on work and organizing. The debate centers on the 
extent to which algorithms can take over many aspects of human work. What will matter is the capacity of 
contemporary workers to adapt their ways of knowing and working and embrace novel technologies, with 
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augmentative effects (Brynjolfsson and Mitchell, 2017; Nelson and Irwin, 2014). In the balance of the 
paper, we examine emerging characteristics of algorithmic technologies and discuss how they might 
transform work and organizing, with implications for future research 
Consequential aspects of learning algorithms 
In this section we examine certain emergent aspects of learning algorithms that make them highly 
consequential for work and organizing. More specifically, we distinguish four consequential aspects: black-
boxed performance, comprehensive digitization, anticipatory quantification, and hidden politics. 
Black-boxed performance 
In today’s digital era, users of web technologies are constantly presented with search results, ads, 
or personalized recommendations that cannot be easily explained, redressed, or adjusted because the 
algorithms behind them are opaque, inaccessible, and unmodifiable.  For one, sophisticated algorithms such 
as Google’s search, Facebook’s newsfeed, or Amazon’s recommendation algorithm constitute the “secret 
sauce” that is crucial to business success. They are worth billions of dollars and are tightly protected as 
intellectual property (O’Neil 2017). Design choices are internal to the firm and unavailable for public 
scrutiny for both commercial and competitive reasons. As a result, unknown design choices that reflect 
social assumptions and economic valuation become inscribed into the software. Different people putting in 
the same search term are likely to generate different recommendations because  the algorithm takes into 
account additional individual and contextual factors. Even if auditing were to be applied to such algorithms, 
understanding them would be limited only to a select professional class of people with highly specialized 
skills and technical training for comprehending code of immense size and logical complexity (Dourish, 
2016). 
While the above sources of inscrutability could be said to apply to other more traditional types of 
algorithms as well, learning algorithms are even more opaque because they do not rely on pre-specified 
instructions, but on evolving weights and networks of connections that get refined with each additional data 
point (Burrell, 2016; Michalski, Carbonell, and Mitchell, 2013). As a matter of fact, even if a learning 
algorithm is coded in a very simple and comprehensible way, understanding how it arrived at its result can 
still be unclear, even to its developers, due to the quantity and complex interaction of the data fed into the 
algorithm. For example, when activists in the Occupy Wall Street movement accused Twitter of censoring 
their activities from becoming a trending topic, the engineers at Twitter insisted that no censorship had 
taken place, and while they could explain the code that they had written, they were unable to explain why 
the Occupy Wall Street activities did not become a trending topic (Dourish, 2016). 
To some extent, the inscrutability of learning algorithms could prove to be a positive aspect because 
the less people understand how the learning algorithm comes to a certain outcome, the less they will try to 
“game” the system (O'Neil, 2016). This could result in decreasing corruption in various instances such as 
credit scoring in loan application processes, competitive tendering, or evaluation of work performance. 
From that perspective, learning algorithms can function as panopticons, imposing discipline that is often 
desired in the workplace (Burton-Jones, 2014; Zuboff, 1988). However, black-boxed performance may also 
result in various problematic situations. In the case of legal learning algorithms that apply high legal 
standards to the judgement of legal cases, if defendants ask why they were convicted, it would not be fair 
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to get a response from the system’s developers that ‘the system trained on tons of data and thus came to 
this decision’ (Tegmark, 2017). Similarly, in an accident with a self-driving car, it could be difficult to 
identify the specific reasons that led the self-driving car to act in the way it did,  so as to allocate legal 
responsibility accordingly (Knight, 2017). Overall, learning algorithms increasingly produce unknown and 
unexpected outcomes that cannot be explained by humans in a straightforward manner (Dourish, 2016). As 
we discuss later in greater detail, this poses significant consequences for various facets of work and 
organizing. 
Comprehensive Digitization  
The performance of learning algorithms improves with the provision of very large and accurate 
data sets. An important aspect of today’s algorithms is the combining of comprehensive data extracted in 
one context with data from other contexts and possibly of different nature. For example, the digitization of 
various markers of the physical and built environment provides digital maps and GPS based location data.  
The digitization of devices and machines (known as the Internet of Things) adds another source of important 
data. Adding to these the digitization of economic transactions and human interactions, along with  the 
digital tracing of human activities through mobile devices, we accomplish “the digitization of just about 
everything” (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, p. 65).  
This amalgamation of previously separate facets of life allows for algorithms to use a much richer 
set of inputs with the goal of arriving at more precise predictions.  For instance, an Amazon bookstore 
algorithm with access to various facets of a professor’s social life,  published research, and  utterances on 
Twitter or on various social networks can potentially provide more accurate book suggestions. Companies 
such as Facebook collect approximately 100 different dimensions of user activity on their platform and 
combine them with third-party databases that provide complementary information regarding income, net 
worth, house value, banking and financial information, charity donation, digital radio listening, podcast 
downloads, and pharmacy purchases. Such a mashup allows the targeting of consumers with more precisely 
appealing advertising and offers (Bergstein, 2017). 
However, this algorithmic dependence on ubiquitous data is limited by its sensitivity to what data 
is available irrespective of the veracity of the content.  For example, search engine optimization allows the 
skewing of algorithmic results in order to ensure certain results are listed first.  Autocompletion suggestions 
given by Google and other search engines can be extremely useful for users. However, these same results 
can manifest racism, gender bias, and other non-neutral views due to the sensitivity of the learning algorithm 
to historical search activities (Cadwalladr, 2016). As seen in the recent example of the Microsoft TAY 
social media chatbot that learned from the social media streams and from interactions, algorithms can 
generate results that may be racist and misogynist  (Shah and Chakkattu, 2016). For example, as seen in the 
recent 2016 US election, the logic of sharing information that aligns with the users’ expressed opinions and 
preferences (induced from their tracked behavior on social media) can lead to a narrowing of intellectual 
horizon and a propagation of the phenomenon of “fake news” (Olson, 2016).  Furthermore, manipulating 
algorithms to show alternative viewpoints can lead to deeper polarization or a more complete rejection of 
other perspectives (Zuckerberg, 2017). 
Anticipatory quantification 
The output of  learning algorithms is principally a prediction or likelihood of an outcome. Given 
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the lowering costs and easy availability and processing of vast amounts of trace data, it comes as no surprise 
that our society is becoming dominated by the logic of quantification (Espeland and Stevens, 2008). With 
most objects being tagged, locations identified, people’s attributes marked, behavior traced, and interactions 
mapped, all aspects of working and living can be digitally represented and quantified (Wagner-Pacifici et 
al., 2015). This quantitative turn is based on the assumption that digital data can stand for social life; that 
is to say, the detailed measurement of different aspects of a person’s activities and utterances get to be 
constitutive of that person.  
Algorithms can plow through an immense quantity and breadth of data to identify patterns and 
correlations. By studying a large enough number of people and by covering enough of their 
actions/utterances, algorithms seem to know people in counterintuitive, but uncannily accurate ways.  For 
example, an analysis of less than a hundred of a person’s Facebook “likes” can lead to the identification 
with high accuracy of a person’s skin color, sexual orientation, or political affiliation (Grassegger and 
Krogerus, 2017). More impressively, an algorithmic analysis of less than 300 of such “likes” can often 
predict an individual’s personality better than their friends, family, or even spouse (Youyou, Kosinski and 
Stillwell, 2015). In short, this ability to build statistical models that target  individuals via customized 
messages that leverage aspects of personality, political leanings, and affective proclivities is the culmination 
of the digital quantification logic. 
Learning algorithms can be reductionist because they inscribe predictive models of action based on 
a limited set of predictive variables emerging from the model’s underlying data.  Predictive modeling builds 
on correlational analysis of a large number of dimensions to generate a predictive model that focuses on 
future actions. A possible impact is to reduce individuals to a set of measured dimensions and such a 
representation avoids dealing with a person’s (or object’s) evolution and discourages alternative 
explorations that may explain how one ends up in a specific category (Ananny, 2016). For example, is the 
Amazon “customers who bought this item also bought” algorithm adequately accurate in predicting similar 
reading preferences between two adults because they both purchased books for young children? This focus 
on assigning people to categories is somewhat similar to the thought process of an individual who sees 
others primarily through the lens of ethnic categories and predictively assigns stereotypical actions/opinions 
to them. Learning algorithms thus cannot, as currently constituted, take into account the complex nature of 
individuals, their intentionality, or their desires, leading to a necessarily skewed, imperfect, and incomplete 
digital representation.  
As the regime of quantification enters multiple fields, from journalism and academic practice to 
the management of human resources, such algorithmic outcomes appear to be more objective than humans 
(Boyd and Crawford, 2012), reducing the output of decision making processes to the output of a predictive 
model. As a result, people may be evaluated based on their propensity to act rather than on their actions 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2012). For example, several states in the US are already allowing a 
proprietary algorithm to decide on whether inmates should be granted parole, based on the likelihood of not 
committing a crime (Israni, 2017). Furthermore, as algorithms are automatically executed, they can now 
operate with no human judgment to mitigate their operation (Introna, 2016). Yet, by processing people and 
situations into specific buckets, the algorithm is seldom neutral.  Some predictions, such as when a company 
tries to determine which  customers are most likely to be receptive to its salespeople, are less consequential.  
Other predictions, however, such as no-fly lists or predictive policing watch lists, are less benign for the 
“false-positives” on the list. This unbound empiricism seems to lack feedback mechanisms that allow users 
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to review their publicly available data records for errors/omissions or to explain certain associations that 
put them in one bucket or another or even choose the buckets they wish to associate with (Tufekci, 2014). 
Individuals are effectively reduced to how the algorithm categorizes them, with serious implications such 
as erroneously being assigned a high probability of committing an undesirable act.  
Hidden politics 
As with other technologies, algorithms are political in their design (Akrich, 1992; Winner, 1980). For one, 
algorithms are imbued with the value choices of their designers, whether these have been made implicitly 
or explicitly (Introna, 2016). The criteria included in the algorithmic processes reflect valuation schemes, 
beliefs, and ethical standards. Those design decisions are not necessarily the result of a collective decision, 
or are written in official codes of conduct. Instead, they are often made in an informal, intuitive, and 
idiosyncratic way by the individual who designs the algorithm (Annany, 2016; Kitchin, 2014). As a result, 
whether intendedly or unintendedly, algorithms become artifacts with political qualities, giving certain 
people, objects, ideas, and events higher power, status, visibility, or importance than others (Annany, 2016). 
For example, search engine algorithms select and rank web pages while using a set of decision criteria (such 
as keywords, stop words, or advertising bids) that have been pre-defined by their designers (Introna and 
Nissenbaum, 2000). It would come as no surprise then that news about social movements are often excluded 
from the search engines of certain countries, or that Google would eventually be accused of prioritising its 
own related websites in relevant search queries (European Commission, 2017).  
Beyond designers’ intentions, algorithms may have political consequences due to the datasets that 
they are entwined with. Politics play out in the classification, selection, and pre-processing of the data that 
is fed into an algorithmic technology. Such categorizations, inclusions, and exclusions constitute a 
significant political and semantic parameter that influences the algorithmic outcome (Bowker and Star, 
2000). For example, in credit-scoring loan applications, the classification process that determines what 
constitutes a credit-worthy applicant will inevitably include the values and beliefs  of the practitioners who 
do the pre-processing of the data and the pre-classification of the training dataset, thus possibly introducing 
bias (O’Neil, 2016). If the algorithm prioritizes a negative correlation between living in a low income 
neighbourhood and loan repayment likelihood, the algorithm could end up discriminating against minority 
applicants in ways contrary to existing laws. Human supervision and monitoring may become necessary 
when the algorithm has legal or political consequences. Finally, as the prolifertion of fake news on social 
media demonstrates, there is no easy way for an algorithm that prioritizes the sharing of links by users to 
identify in an “objective” manner the veracity of news and what to do about it (Dewey, 2016). Considering 
data to be raw is an “oxymoron” (Bowker, 2005; Gitelman, 2013), meaning that data is never pure, raw, or 
objective. When data is personal, sensitive, or can lead to economic/reputational consequences, it can no 
longer be considered as apolitical. 
Consequences for work and organizing 
Learning algorithms are likely to transform knowledge work and its organization in qualitatively 
different ways than historical technology advances have done. On the surface, we are likely to continue 
observing increases in automation, gains in productivity, job gains/losses, and the emergence of novel 
occupational categories, as we have done in the past. However, the combined effects of black-boxed 
performance, comprehensive digitization, anticipatory quantification, and hidden politics that characterize 
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learning algorithms are likely to raise unexpected challenges that organizations, occupations, and 
professions must confront. In the following sections, we discuss several consequential areas of inquiry that 
can serve as points of departure for future studies of algorithms and organizing.  
Transforming expertise 
Routine cognitive tasks that are well-defined and can be reduced to sets of rules and patterns are 
likely to be taken over by learning algorithms. Advancements in deep learning approaches coupled with 
comprehensive digitization mean that learning algorithms can now emulate the ways in which tacit 
knowledge is acquired by workers. For example, machine learning techniques involving image recognition, 
a process that is difficult to explicitly articulate and explain but that we, as humans, develop through 
experience, can now discriminate with an accuracy that surpasses our own (Esteva et al., 2017). For most 
jobs with a tacit knowledge component, up to 30 percent of tasks could be directly taken over by algorithms 
(Manyika et al.,  2017). The challenge for workers and organizations is to understand which parts of jobs 
are most likely to be automated, how it affects the rest of the job, and how to manage the tension inherent 
in the emergent entwining between people and the algorithm. 
As with other technologies that threaten the legitimacy of professional expertise, learning 
algorithms are likely to be resisted by occupational members. As learning algorithms enter jurisdictional 
spaces traditionally controlled by knowledge workers, their coexistence with humans is likely to lead to 
clashes over what type of expertise is valued and whose expertise has primacy.  For example, a traditional 
salesperson who is used to relational ways of knowing that involve personal and frequent contact with the 
customer and detailed knowledge of the client’s context, will likely need to shift to new ways of knowing 
built around an analytics algorithm that constructs a model of sales and then identifies sales opportunities 
based on prediction modelling (Pachidi et al., 2014).  These algorithmic ways of knowing may be difficult 
to adopt if knowledge workers are unable to learn, manage, and control the technology's black-boxed 
performance. In cases in which the accuracy of the algorithmic output proves to be higher and leads to 
devaluation of human expertise, it is likely that the affected occupations will devote more of their identities 
and tasks to monitoring, improving upon, leveraging, and auditing algorithms. 
For skilled professions whose expertise and training are dependent upon tasks suitable for learning 
algorithms (image recognition tasks for example), the reliance on such technologies by incumbents for 
routine tasks may threaten the development of the profession’s future experts. If trainees must make do 
with decreasing participation in the work that they must ultimately perform, legitimate peripheral 
participants will face challenges in progressing to the center of their practice communities (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991). Further, over time, as incumbent experts retire, the replenishment of the occupational 
expertise that understands the tasks taken over by the algorithm is in question.  The medical profession is a 
case in point. Intelligent heart and lung image recognition algorithms are already guiding radiologists 
toward certain diagnoses, by identifying suspicious tissue and attaching specific probabilities of malignancy 
to them, and compare favorably with board-certified doctors (Mukherjee, 2017). A recent study about the  
introduction of robotic surgery in teaching hospitals showed how trainees, no longer able to  assist surgeons 
directly at the operating table, worked around norms and conventions of the surgical profession to learn in 
vicarious, self-directed, and less legitimate ways with mixed outcomes (Beane, 2018). For other 
occupational groups, algorithms may be leveraged to train newcomers more efficiently. For example, 
Udacity has already developed automated sales support systems built on chat room data designed to 
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conversationally coach in real time, rather than taking over the work of customer service representatives 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2017).  Thus, while short-term efficiency, productivity, and value gains from 
learning algorithms are evident, they must be balanced with long-term consequences for the quality and 
quantity of professional expertise and the future of skilled work. 
Reshaping occupational work and boundaries 
Beyond taking over routine components of knowledge work, the deployment of learning algorithms 
may foster the need for a changed form of occupational accountability. If algorithmic predictions were 
automatically turned into action without additional scrutiny or human monitoring, who becomes 
accountable for “mistakes,” misdiagnoses, or for when erroneous convictions become contested. Simply, 
learning algorithms require humans to ensure accountability (Lupton and Jutel, 2015).  There could be 
extremely atypical cases that the algorithm may miss and that a human could still recognize.  In our 
radiology example, failure of the algorithm to identify a rare form of cancer or to misdiagnose a scan 
because of an interfering condition not previously encountered by the algorithm, can have life-altering 
consequences for the patient. In addition, the algorithm assumes a systematic process by which a human 
tacitly performs every “routine task” (Bergstein, 2018). For example, in predicting how a judge may rule 
in a criminal case (through patterns of complex relationships between the facts of a case and prior decisions 
for similar cases), the algorithms would assume that the judge would come up with the same results for all 
cases with the same characteristics (Remus and Levy, 2017). But the hallmark of human decision making, 
especially in highly consequential situations, is to rely not just on previously encountered patterns, but also 
on a highly diverse set of contextual factors.  Thus, the judge in practice can vary his/her decision-making 
“steps” for cases with similar characteristics based on factors not captured in the training data but germane 
to the case, limiting the predictive power of the algorithm.   
Much attention has been focused on the ability of learning algorithms to take over many of the 
repetitive and routine tasks that comprise most knowledge jobs (Frey and Osborne, 2017; Manyika et al., 
2017). It is unclear whether professions will be unable to adapt, as they have always done in periods of 
technological change (Anteby et al., 2017). A more likely outcome is for algorithms to augment the 
importance of human judgement in knowledge work.  The case of radiology could be illustrative of how 
knowledge work may evolve.  On one hand, some computer scientists contend that hospitals “should stop 
training radiologists now” (Mukherjee, 2017, p. 12), because algorithms are starting to recognize 
malignancies with the same level of accuracy as the typical radiologist.  However, a more likely scenario 
is for the radiologists to happily relinquish the preliminary scanning of medical images to the algorithm in 
order to focus on the more complicated cases, or those that the algorithm finds ambiguous.  Another possible 
outcome is the migration of image reading to other professionals such as emergency department doctors 
who can now rely on the algorithm to identify urgent medical issues without waiting for the radiologist 
report.   While it is possible that there will be a need for a lower number of radiologists overall, those who 
remain in the profession are likely to become even more specialized, engaging in work requiring complex 
interpretation and judgement.  
Learning algorithms are likely to usher a transformation of many professions away from their 
current focus and priorities toward new identities and ways of working. Some occupations may leverage 
the capacities of the technology to provide informational insights for learning to repurpose their expertise 
and re-conceptualize their identities. For example, in the past librarians redefined their domains of expertise 
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following the introduction and development of internet search. Over time, and as search technologies 
became more sophisticated, librarians became “connectors of people and ideas” by helping information-
seekers sort through vast volumes of information, as opposed to simply performing searches for them 
(Nelson and Irwin, 2014). More recently, a study of technology-enabled crowdsourcing at NASA traced 
how resident scientists redefined themselves as solution-seekers rather than problem solvers. In so doing, 
they did not attempt to acquire and understand the necessary scientific knowledge required to solve the 
complex scientific problems they put to the crowd, but rather used the technologies to become experts at 
finding the rare others who could (Lifshitz-Assaf, 2017). Similar changes are likely to emerge for all 
professions affected by learning algorithms and will be accompanied by shifting identities and renegotiated 
occupational boundaries. 
Providing new forms of control 
Learning algorithms are gradually producing a new form of organizational control. Across a variety 
of jobs with structured, decomposable sub-tasks or with concrete deliverables that are subject to ratings or 
evaluation by the crowds of users, the anticipatory quantification  aspect of algorithms is bounding the 
action possibilities available to individual workers and reducing their discretion (Orlikowski and Scott, 
2014; Annany, 2016). For example, Amazon workers (cynically referred to as “Amabots”) are often being 
evaluated primarily by the time it takes them to locate and secure packages off the shelf for shipping. 
Similarly, journalists are increasingly being ranked and compared based on algorithm-generated metrics of 
online article popularity. Uber drivers are dynamically receiving different income for the same work based 
on time-based analytics with little forewarning, explanation, or redress (O’Connor, 2016). A recent 
enterprise-based communication application, Slack, is using learning algorithms to predict which messages 
are of higher importance and give a sense of the topics each employee participates in (Woyke, 2018). Thus, 
knowledge workers face an interesting paradox in today’s algorithm-imbued work settings: the recorded 
actions that may comprise the basis for their agency and control might be used to regulate or even erode 
this control. The availability of traces of human behavior can constrain agency in subtle ways that are not 
readily discernible to users shut out of the design, deployment, and evolution of the learning algorithms 
(Tufekci, 2014). Thus, the learning algorithm has the potential to revive the piecework system, one that is 
minutely monitored, only this time with an algorithmic managerial span of control whose logic is opaque.  
To counteract these structuring forces, knowledge workers will likely engage in counter-
performances designed to game algorithmic directives and their anticipatory quantification: they may 
employ gaming strategies, limit or censor their participation, or use political resources to alter the basis for 
their evaluation. First, gaming strategies are already widespread. For example, in order to produce 
substantive articles of their choosing, journalists have been reported to buy ratings performance by 
producing several quick-and-dirty clickbait articles to “reset the score” (Christin, 2014). Recent media 
coverage of the FitBit wearable exposed how workers gamed the device and manipulated their fitness data 
to accumulate rewards, with consequences for organizations that promote their use to keep down health 
insurance premiums (Bachman, 2016; Weiczner, 2016). Second, users may limit their participation or 
participate selectively. In the Slack example, because utterances/actions are heavily analyzed, knowledge 
workers may choose not to engage in debates or questioning and to  contribute curated comments that they 
believe will be assessed favorably by the algorithm only. Lastly, to counteract the monitoring of the 
algorithms, occupational communities may engage in political framing strategies from inside organizations 
to convince their hierarchies to change the value-imbued assumptions behind the metrics (Pine and 
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Liboiron, 2015). For journalists, this may mean lobbying for readership engagement metrics rather than the 
number of page views. As sophisticated actors encounter algorithmic structures in their everyday work, 
they are likely to use the cultural tools at their disposal as resources for action (Swidler, 1986). In order to 
retain control, knowledge workers are likely to navigate a constant tension between “working to the 
algorithm” and “working the algorithm.” Their resultant actions and improvisations are likely to generate 
performative struggles that propel work trajectories and possibilities in ways yet unexplored.  
Augmenting Coordination 
Learning algorithms will enable organizations to divide and allocate tasks as well as to integrate 
efforts in novel ways. Learning algorithms are already automating administrative coordination by managing 
task decomposition and integration (Zammuto et al., 2007).  In online communities, such as Amazon 
Mechanical Turk or Upwork, platforms that attract very large numbers of contract workers or volunteer 
contributors from all over the world, algorithms are used to solve the organizational problem of recruitment, 
negotiating contracts, and motivating employees. The tasks are then decomposed by the algorithm into 
smaller ones that allow a divide-and-assign strategy so that they can be allocated to individual workers 
(Faraj et al., 2011; Boudreau and Lakhani, 2013). Once subtasks are completed, they are algorithmically 
re-composed into a working whole. Likely outcomes of the growing capability of learning algorithms 
include their ability to assemble high-functioning teams by matching expertise, the flagging of individuals 
who cause bottlenecks or are not working to expectation, the performance of quality control and task 
rerouting, and finally the dynamic reconfiguration of roles and workflows (Faraj et al., 2018; Valentine et 
al., 2017). For example, corporate applications, such as Slack, are dynamically tracing evolving knowledge 
conversations and are matching the “right people with the right information to do the right tasks” (Woyke, 
2018). These emergent AI-powered technologies point to the increasing reliance on learning algorithms as 
mechanisms for new forms of coordination that reduce the transaction, search, and coordination costs of 
matching a distributed population of workers to specific tasks. Algorithms also make work more visible to 
co-workers, sending pings for completed tasks or reminders to slow performers (Schildt, 2017).  
 Algorithmic coordination that is focused on the minutia of tasks is likely to limit knowledge 
recombination and the emergence of serendipitous or novel solutions. For example, one feature of the Slack 
application previously discussed is that it is able to scan a user’s unread messages and to flag a handful of 
messages that are deemed as most important by its algorithms. In this example, the learning algorithm 
“curates” what knowledge workers pay attention to, making its own inclusion/exclusion decisions based on 
an analysis of the content of a person’s corpus of online communication. Workers that are primarily exposed 
to knowledge related to a narrow expertise domain are likely to become confined to a limited way of 
thinking and reasoning. Instead, they may prefer to understand and appreciate other epistemic viewpoints 
and may value the possibility of novel knowledge combination (Faraj et al., 2016). While learning 
algorithms may improve the coordination of work, they may inadvertently limit the knowledge that 
employees are exposed to, which holds detrimental effects for knowledge diversity and organizational 
innovation (Dougherty and Dunne, 2012; Dahlander and Frederiksen, 2012). 
Discussion & Conclusion 
Learning algorithms can be considered performative due to the extent to which their use can shape 
and alter work and organizational realities.  They raise important research questions for organizational 
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scholars related to expertise, occupational boundaries, control, and the coordination of knowledge work.  
Our evaluation of these questions points to the various ways in which learning algorithms are likely to alter 
work and organizing in qualitatively different ways beyond simply signaling an acceleration of long-term 
technology trends. Beyond the direct impact of organizing, these technologies foreground digital data in all 
its forms and are implicitly dismissive of the value of the situated experience held by embedded, embodied 
social actors (Constantiou and Kallinikos, 2014). With little societal debate or oversight, learning 
algorithms produce “the possibility of modifying the behaviors of persons and things for profit and control” 
(Zuboff, 2015 p. 85). Yet, “who” exactly does the modifying? That remains the core political and societal 
question that algorithm researchers need to address.  
An emergent issue for both academics and policy makers is the extent to which algorithms are 
authorized to make individual and organizational choices, for what types of decisions, and with what 
implications. Already, a number of algorithmic decisions that rely primarily on digital data at the exclusion 
of more qualitative and complex types of parameters have shown the difficulty of assigning the authority 
to the algorithm. For example, an investigation performed for a lawsuit by two teachers who were 
terminated as a result of an algorithmic decision, based on student quantitative test results, exposed the 
inefficiency of the algorithm in holistically assessing teaching performance (Webb, 2017). Thus, learning 
algorithms come with highly performative effects that arise through their usage and bring about a novel 
form of evaluation and performance that emphasizes quantified comparison and ranking –based on easily 
available digital data (Orlikowski and Scott, 2014).  Users may become increasingly lured by the inscribed 
technological preferences and alter their behaviours accordingly. Over time, this influences social 
expectations and norms and gives rise to new institutions that shape how citizens are rated, the kind of  
stories they have access to, or even which political candidate they may find themselves swayed to vote for 
(Grassegger and Krogerus, 2017). More than with previous technological change moments, society needs 
to implement the right policies that regulate the designer goals and the corporate control behind the 
development of such highly performative technologies.  
To break with the existing laissez-faire approaches to “algorithmification,” radical proposals, such 
as those advocating the taxation of technologies that replace the work previously done by a human worker 
(Schiller, 2017), represent markers in a societal debate that is yet to take place. Other proposals are being 
put forth regarding governance mechanisms to manage the full transparency and accessibility of individual 
data. An example is the provision of individual approval mechanisms for publicly-available personal data 
in order to control the data that third parties are given access to (Stohl, Stohl, and Leonardi, 2016). 
Currently, individual users on social networks are not afforded control over their own data and their digital 
traces remain exploitable. Their youthful and not so youthful indiscretions surface as part of their digital 
persona and become increasingly consequential in a world governed by algorithms.   
By challenging our existing frameworks that ontologically separate between people and things, 
learning algorithms bring to the fore issues of technology morality. Given that algorithms blur the line 
between user and technology, human and technological agency become entangled. Learning algorithms that 
imitate cognition and behavior cannot grasp the ethical choices that humans are faced with.  For example, 
a self-driving car algorithm can observe the occupant driving too fast or in a disorderly manner.  The issue 
of what the algorithm should do, or should be allowed to do, raises complex ethical issues: can it 
“overpower” the driver whenever they drive in a seemingly dangerous manner (they could be in a hurry) or 
only under select circumstances (being drunk). These technologies, due to their active mediation of human 
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intent and action, may need to incorporate a moral dimension (Verbeek, 2009).  A societal evaluation of 
the extent to which the technology can influence or even control the user are crucial to ensure a balance 
between society and the developers of the technology. Leaving the decision of what the algorithm can or 
cannot do in the hands of the commercial developer may be too shortsighted from a societal point of view.   
In conclusion, learning algorithms offer a surface-level similarity to the Weberian bureaucracy in 
that they create a new digital iron-cage, but whose bars are not readily graspable for bending – where rules 
are not readily understood or available for interpretation and scrutiny. Algorithms are already changing 
work so that all aspects of one’s performance are quantified, compared to others, and managed against an 
algorithmic model that is likely to usher in unexpected transformations that need to be better understood 
(Orlikowski and Scott, 2016). By raising dilemmas regarding expertise, occupational boundaries, 
coordination, and control, learning algorithms are profoundly consequential and compel researchers and 
practitioners to expand our understanding of their transformative effects and their broader social and ethical 
implications. Answering the question of the consequences of learning algorithms for work and organizing 
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